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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. 1. Did the court below err in failing to grant plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment on defendant's counterclaim for breach of contract? Review of a 
trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is for correctness with no 
deference to the court below. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 
71. 
2. Did the court below err in granting Mr. Young's motion for summary 
judgment on the firm's breach of fiduciary duty claim and in denying the firm's motion 
for partial summary judgment on that claim? The standard of review on the issue is the 
same as set forth in the preceding paragraph. 
3. Did Mr. Young present sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict 
and did the court below err in denying the firm's motion for a directed verdict on the 
contract claim? In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, 
this Court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict and will reverse only when it 
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concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Geisdorf v. Doughty, 
972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998). 
4. Did the court below err in precluding the firm from offering evidence of 
Mr. Young's competing law practice while employed by the firm? A trial court's 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 99. 
B. 1. The first issue was preserved below by plaintiff's motions for summary 
judgment (R. at 32-50, 494-511). 
2. The second and fourth issues were preserved by plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment (R. at 1158-1165). 
3. The third issue was preserved below by plaintiff's motion for a directed 
verdict (R. at 2026 pp. 419-20). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Robert Young was hired by Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler (the "firm") in mid-
April, 1995 to work as an associate attorney. Mr. Young's starting salary was 
$70,000.00. He had no written contract of employment. (R. at 2026, pp. 293-295.) 
Carl Barton, a former member of the firm, testified that he told Mr. Young 
that his compensation at the firm would be limited to his salary and would not include 
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any amount for contingent fee recoveries. Mr. Young testified that no such 
conversation took place. (R. at 2026, p. 292.) 
Beginning in 1996, Mr. Young began representing Mr. Charles Krause in 
connection with serious injuries Mr. Krause suffered in a helicopter crash. Mr. Young 
was co-counsel for Mr. Krause with a Texas law firm, Howie & Sweeney. Mr. 
Krause's personal injury claim was filed in the State of Texas. At the same time, Mr. 
Young undertook the representation of Mountain West Helicopter, the owner of the 
helicopter involved in Mr. Krause's accident. Mr. Young was also co-counsel in that 
action, filed in Federal District Court for the District of Utah, with Howie & Sweeney. 
(R at 2026, pp. 308-309; Exhibit 15.) 
In the fall of 1998, Mr. Young inquired of Carl Barton about how the 
contingent fee in the Krause matter was going to be divided between himself and the 
firm, apparently under the mistaken belief that he had a legal claim to some portion of 
the fee. (R. at 2026, p. 307.) Mr. Barton took the inquiry to be a request from Mr. 
Young that he be allowed to participate personally in any significant recovery of fees in 
the Krause and Mountain West matters and raised that request with the firm's board of 
directors. The board agreed to consider such a request and assigned John Chindlund, 
president of the firm, and John Ashton, head of the firm's litigation section, to meet 
with Mr. Young in an attempt to reach an agreement with Mr. Young regarding how he 
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might share in the fee recovery. (R. at 2026, pp. 310-311.) By Mr. Young's telling, 
at the first such meeting between Ashton, Chindlund and Young, Ashton and Chindlund 
represented to Mr. Young that the firm expected to be fair with him. For his part, Mr. 
Young said he expected to be fair as well. (R. at 2026, p. 313.) These individuals 
met a number of times in late 1998 and early 1999, with the discussions primarily 
focusing on what portion of the fee had to be used to compensate the firm for what it 
felt to be Mr. Young's collection deficit during his period of employment. (R. at 2026, 
pp. 313-318.) Eventually, Mr. Young and the firm agreed that, in principle, what 
should be done would be that the hours devoted to both of the helicopter cases would be 
multiplied by Mr. Young's hourly rate and that number (or some percentage thereof) 
would be subtracted from the fees recovered and the balance would be divided between 
the firm and Mr. Young, with the firm getting two-thirds of the remaining balance and 
Mr. Young one-third. (R. at 2026, pp. 324-25; Exhibit 24.) 
Mr. Chindlund put his understanding of this agreement in writing and 
delivered it to Mr. Young on May 5, 1999, with a request that Mr. Young sign the 
offer to acknowledge his acceptance. (Exhibit 24.) 
On June 11, 1999, the Krause case was settled at a mediation held in Texas 
which Mr. Young did not attend. Mr. Young learned of the settlement on June 14, 
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1999. He learned that under the terms of the settlement the fee to be paid to the firm 
would be approximately $650,000.00. (R. at 2026, pp. 338, 382-83.) 
On June 15, 1999, Mr. Young made a counteroffer to the firm's proposal, 
without disclosing the fact of, or the amount of, the settlement, wherein he requested 
that only 60% of his hours times his hourly rate be deducted from the Krause fee before 
dividing it one-third to him and two-thirds to the firm. He also sought additional 
guarantees from the firm in the form of becoming a shareholder, having a guaranteed 
salary level for the next two years and having a say in how the firm's bonus pool would 
be distributed in 1999. He asserted that Ashton and Chindlund had promised him some 
of these additional benefits. (Exhibit 25.) 
Ashton and Chindlund denied making any such assurances and expressed 
dissatisfaction with Mr. Young's representations to the contrary. (R. at 2025, pp. 36-
41.) 
On July 2, 1999, Mr. Young wrote another letter to the board of directors 
wherein he expressed his intention to leave the firm if no agreement was reached in 
connection with his counteroffer. (Exhibit 29.) The firm accepted Mr. Young's 
resignation. (R. at 2026, p. 348.) 
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When the fee of $641,548.38 was received it was by a check made out to 
both the firm and Mr. Young, which check was deposited into a joint account pending 
resolution of this litigation. (R. at 6-9.) 
After Mr. Young left the firm, the firm became aware that during 1998 and 
1999, Mr. Young had been doing legal work "independently" from the firm and had 
been keeping the fees generated by such work. For example, on January 26, 1998, 
Mr. Young informed Moses Lebovits, a California attorney who had retained Mr. 
Young as local counsel to represent the interests of Saundra Charlesworth and her 
children, that because "the firm has been giving me some trouble" about certain 
contingent fee cases, "I will assist you in this matter independent of my firm work." 
(R. at 1400.) During 1998 and 1999, Mr. Young performed work for the 
Charlesworth's for which he was ultimately paid $8,665.25 for work done while 
employed by the firm, including filing pleadings in the firm's name. (R. at 1382-83; 
1401-1417.) Mr. Young actively sought to conceal this conduct from the firm. At the 
same time he was petitioning the court for approval of the settlement in the 
Charlesworth case, Mr. Young instructed a firm employee to write-off all time and 
charges attributed to that case because, in his words, it was "gone". (R. at 262-63.) 
He also admitted receiving and keeping other fees in connection with work performed 
while employed at the firm. (R. at 1383.) 
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The firm filed this action seeking recovery of the entirety of the Krause fee 
and for further relief for Mr. Young's breach of fiduciary duty in engaging in a 
competing law practice with the firm. (R. at 1-5.) Mr. Young counterclaimed, 
alleging that the firm had promised him that he would receive a fair and equitable 
portion of the Krause fee and that such a promise was an express contract entitling him 
to a jury trial on the issue of what, in fact, would constitute a fair and equitable portion 
of the fee. (R. at 10-31.) 
The firm twice moved for summary judgment on Mr. Young's counterclaim 
and both motions were denied with regard to Mr. Young's contract claim. The firm 
also moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a liability determination on its 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. Mr. Young moved for summary judgment on that 
claim, asserting he owed the firm no fiduciary duty. The trial court granted Mr. 
Young's motion, denied that of the firm and entered an order precluding the firm from 
offering any evidence about Mr. Young's alleged breach of fiduciary duty in the trial 
on his contract claim. (R. at 1554-57.) 
The case was tried to a jury. The court denied the firm's motion for directed 
verdict and the jury returned a verdict determining that Mr. Young was entitled to 
$280,000.00 as a fair and equitable share of the Krause fee. 
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The plaintiff's position in this appeal is that there was no evidence to support 
the verdict rendered on the defendant's claim of an express contract to receive a "fair 
and equitable" portion of the fee collected in connection with the Krause litigation. In 
an effort to satisfy the requirement that plaintiff marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict, plaintiff will note those portions of the record which defendant might arguably 
suggest are supportive of the verdict without implying that such evidence does, in fact, 
support the verdict. 
When asked about his entitlement to fair and equitable compensation from the 
Krause fee, Mr. Young testified as follows: 
Q. You mentioned fair and equitable compensation. 
Let me ask you about that. Was there a discussion about 
that in this meeting? 
A. Well, in virtually every meeting we had, Mr. 
Chindlund or Mr. Ashton or me would make a comment 
along the lines that we expect to be fair about this. They 
suggested, "We expect to be fair with you, Mr. Young, 
in coming to an understanding as to what is fair and 
equitable compensation." 
I suggested I expected to be fair with them in 
contributing a fee I was generating to the firm. And 
that, from my perspective, we had an understanding 
from the outset that we were going to be fair and 
equitable about this, that I was going to be fairly 
compensated and that what remained to be resolved was 
what represented fair compensation. 
(R. at 2026 pp. 312-13.) 
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On cross-examination, Mr. Young affirmed that this was the substance of his 
supposed agreement with the firm. 
Q. When you started having the discussions, as I 
understood you to say, the three of you get together and 
you say mutually to each other, back and forth, "I expect 
to be fair;" they say, "we expect to be fair." Correct? 
A. Correct. 
(R. at 2026 p. 376.) 
The only other testimony of Mr. Young regarding an alleged agreement was 
his conclusory assertion that an agreement existed. On redirect examination he was 
asked if he had an agreement regarding compensation and he testified, without 
specifying why, that there was an agreement "[t]hat I would be fairly and equitably 
compensated." 
(R. at 2026 p. 419.) 
The testimony of Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton was generally the same as 
Mr. Young's. Chindlund testified as follows: 
Q. At any time, in the meetings that you had with Mr. 
Young, did you or Mr. Ashton, in your presence, 
promise Mr. Young that he would receive a fair and 
equitable portion of the fee? 
A. We told Rob the firm wanted to treat him fairly. 
Q. Did you promise him that you would? 
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A. Not in the sense of a promise. It was along the 
lines of "The firm wants to treat you fairly." 
(R. at 2025 p. 61.) 
On cross-examination Mr. Chindlund responded as follows: 
Q. Now, if I understood you correctly, you just 
testified that you had told Mr. Young, in your 
negotiations with him, that the firm wanted to be fair in 
terms of compensating Mr. Young with regard to [a] 
successful outcome in the cases. That's true, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you told him that, did you mean it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You indicated that you were [reluctant] to 
characterize what you said to Mr. Young as a promise. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you - - you told him that the firm wanted to be 
fair with him and would be fair with him, and you 
wanted him to believe it, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you meant it. 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 2025 p. 64.) 
Q. It's true, isn't it, that when you were meeting with 
Mr. Young, you and Mr. Ashton wanted to be - - wanted 
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to provide Mr. Young with fair and equitable 
compensation, if there were recoveries in the helicopter 
cases? 
A. Wanted to reward Rob, if his efforts resulted in a 
good recovery for the firm. And I guess, when I say 
good, what I'm talking about is a recovery over and 
above what the firm had invested in the case. 
Q. And you wanted to do that and you told Mr. Young 
that you wanted to do that, isn't that true? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. And it's correct, isn't it, that, in your meetings, you 
told Mr. Young that the firm intended to fairly and 
equitably compensate Mr. Young if the result that you 
described was achieved. It's true, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 2025 p. 91.) 
John Ashton's testimony about the meetings with Mr. Young was to the same 
effect. 
Q. When you met with Mr. Young, it was your desire, 
and Mr. Chindlund's, wasn't it, to provide fair 
compensation to Mr. Young out of recoveries in the 
helicopter cases if recoveries were received. 
A. We wanted to be - - we wanted to reward Rob for 
his hard work. Fair compensation; he was fairly 
compensated. 
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Q. Well, didn't you tell Mr. Young that it was your 
desire to reward him and reward him fairly if recoveries 
were received out of the helicopter cases? 
A. Obviously, we wanted to try to be fair in the sense 
of the amount of money that we would pay, but it was an 
amount that was at our choice and our decision. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Young that it was your desire to 
provide him with a fair amount out of the fees? 
A. Probably something like that. I think what we said 
was we wanted to be reasonable and we wanted to try to 
pay him some amount that would be reasonable, if we 
could reach some sort of an agreement. 
(R. at 2025 p. 179.) 
In addition to claiming that Mr. Young had an express agreement to receive a 
fair and equitable portion of the Krause fee, his counsel argued to the jury that Mr. 
Young's original agreement with the firm entitled him to a "fair" portion of the fee. 
The totality of the testimony regarding the terms of Mr. Young's original employment 
agreement with the firm came from the two parties responsible for negotiating Mr. 
Young's employment: Mr. Young and Mr. Ashton. Young testified to those 
negotiations as follows: 
Q. In the course of those meetings and telephone 
conversations [with Ashton], did you arrive at an 
agreement with regard to what the terms of your 
employment would be if you went to work for Prince 
Yeates? 
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A. The only real terms we ever discussed were the 
amount of my compensation and when I would be 
considered for partnership. And that was - - that was the 
extent of what was discussed. 
Q. All right. With regard to the amount of your 
compensation, what was that to be? 
A. We discussed several terms but, ultimately, I 
accepted an offer to work for a $70,000.00 salary. 
Q. And was that salary or compensation to be subject 
to adjustment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Upon what, if anything? 
A. Well, the salary that has been discussed, in my 
mind, was never a guaranteed salary. I understood that I 
was employed at will, that I could quit at any time, that 
they could terminate me at any time. And that salary 
was subject to adjustment up or down, depending on my 
performance. In other words, if I didn't justify my 
salary by the revenue that I brought in, it would be 
reduced or I would be terminated. 
If I more than justified my salary, it would be 
increased or I would leave the firm and take my work 
with me where I felt like I could make more money. 
(R. at 2026 pp. 293-94.) 
Ashton testified similarly. 
Q. Did you have discussions with Rob prior to his 
coming to the firm about what the terms of his 
employment would be? 
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A. Well, generally, that he would be an associate in the 
law firm and that if he decided to join working in our 
law firm that's the position he would assume. 
Q. Did you discuss salary? 
A. We had several discussions about salary with Rob. 
Initially, Rob was looking at several law firms. And my 
recollection is there was discussion about a range of 
salary between $70,000.00 and $80,000.00. 
Q. In your discussion with Mr. Young, did you, at any 
time, give him any indication that his compensation 
would be made up of anything other than his salary? 
A. No 
(R. at 2025 p. 147.) 
On cross, Mr. Ashton further testified as follows: 
Q. You remember that he was going to be an associate, 
true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was discussion about his salary. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the amount of his salary. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was discussion about performance. 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you indicated to Mr. Young that the firm 
would measure his performance, correct. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicated to Mr. Young that his 
compensation would be affected be his performance. 
A. After the first year, yes. 
Q. In other words, if Mr. Young proved himself, if he 
did well, if he attained good results, he could expect to 
make more money. 
A. I think that's generally accurate. 
(R. at 2025 p. 173.) 
Mr. Young acknowledged that at the time of his hiring he had no agreement 
regarding his participation in any contingent fee recovery he might obtain. 
Q. . . . In talking with Mr. Ashton, you had no 
discussion with him, as I understand it, at all about your 
receiving any portion of any contingency fee work that 
you handled, correct? At the outset, in 1995. 
A. We had no discussion about that . . . 
(R. at 2026 p. 372.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence offered at trial failed to demonstrate any promise by the firm to 
pay Mr. Young a fair and equitable portion of the Krause fee. The statements of the 
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firm's representatives that they expected to treat Mr. Young fairly are not of any 
contractual significance. 
Even if an express promise to pay Mr. Young a "fair and equitable" portion 
of the Krause fee had been made, such a promise is too vague and indefinite to permit 
of judicial enforcement. Purported contracts which lack an agreement as to the amount 
to be paid or a formula for the computation of such an amount are unenforceable. This 
is especially true of purported contracts for payment of additional compensation to 
employees, as such purported agreements to pay fair or reasonable amounts in excess 
of the employee's previously agreed to salary provide the fact finder with no guidance 
as to what the parties intended and demonstrate that there was, in fact, no meeting of 
the minds of the parties on, essentially, the only term of the asserted contract. 
Accordingly, the court below erred in denying the firm's motion for 
summary judgment on Mr. Young's counterclaim and in denying the firm's motion for 
a directed verdict. 
As all courts agree that an employee owes his employer a fiduciary duty not 
to compete with the employer within the scope of his agency, the court below erred in 
ruling that Mr. Young's admitted action in practicing law in competition with the firm 
did not constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty. 
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The court also erred in restricting the firm from presenting evidence of Mr. 
Young's misconduct to the jury, as that ruling deprived the jury of knowledge of all the 
circumstances relating to Mr. Young's relationship with the firm, which information 
was important to their consideration of what was fair and equitable under the 
circumstances. Therefore, even if this Court were of the opinion that Mr. Young had 
an enforceable express contract with the firm, the verdict rendered below must be 
vacated and the matter remanded for new trial on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances of the relationship of the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. AS MR. YOUNG PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE THAT HE 
RECEIVED A PROMISE OF A FAIR AND EQUITABLE PORTION 
OF THE FEE AT ISSUE, THE VERDICT RENDERED BELOW IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Young's claim was predicated upon the existence of an express contract 
with the firm. His testimony regarding the asserted contractual entitlement to a "fair" 
portion of the fee generated by the Krause litigation was limited to his statement that, at 
the outset of the negotiations between the firm and Mr. Young, and thereafter, he was 
told by representatives of the firm that they expected to treat him fairly. Such a 
representation has no contractual significance. 
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It is axiomatic that, as a predicate to the existence of a valid, express 
contract, there must be an offer which the offeree is empowered to accept to conclude 
the parties' bargain. As this Court has noted, an 
offer in contemplation of law requires that the proposal 
presented must confer upon the offeree the power to 
create a contract by the offeree's acceptance. 
Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc. 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980). 
It is hornbook law that as a statement of one party's intent does not constitute 
a promise of conduct; it is not an offer capable of forming the basis for an enforceable 
contract. As stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
[a] mere statement of an intention to act in a certain way 
is not a promise upon which a contract can be 
predicated. 
Havashi v. Ihringer. 58 N.W.2d 788, 791 (N.D. 1953). 
The Restatement2d of Contracts § 2(1) makes it clear mere statements of 
intention, opinions or predications are not promises. Id. at comments e. and f. 
This is the universal rule of law because a statement of intention is subject to 
a change of heart, which the speaker is free to act upon in the absence of a commitment 
not to do so. As stated by the Washington Supreme Court, 
an intention to do a thing is not a promise to do it. An 
"intention" is something formed in the mind of man; a 
"promise" is an express undertaking or agreement to 
carry the purpose into effect. 
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Massinger v. Simpson Timber Co., 421 P.2d 674, 677 (Wash. 1966). See also, 
Muscatell v. North Dakota Real Estate Comm'n. 546 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 1996) 
("the mere statement of an intention to act in a certain way is not a promise which can 
be given promissory or contractual effect."); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Clairborne-RenoCo., 64 F.2d 224, 227 (8th Cir. 1933) ("mere expression of an 
intention or desire is not a promise.") 
Because a statement of intention is, in the absence of a commitment to the 
contrary, subject to the will of the speaker to a change of mind, statements of intention 
are frequently equated with "illusory promises," wherein the speaker expressly retains 
the option of performance of the asserted promise. 
It is hornbook law that illusory promises or mere statements of intention, 
which by their term make performance optional with the 
"promisor" whatever course of conduct in other respects 
he may pursue, do not constitute a promise. Although 
such words are often referred to as forming an illusory 
promise, they do not fall within the present definition of 
promise. They may not even manifest an intention on 
the part of the promisor. Even if a present intention is 
manifested, the reservation of an option to change that 
intention means there can be no promisee who is justified 
in an expectation of performance. 
In re Adirondack R. Corp.. 95 Bnkrtcy Rptr. 867, 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting 
Restatement2d, Contracts § 2 comment e.). 
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This Court has previously acknowledged that a statement which contains no 
firm commitment to a future course of conduct cannot form the basis for an enforceable 
contract. 
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a 
statement made in such vague or conditional terms that 
the person making it commits himself to nothing, the 
alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory". An illusory 
promise, neither binds the person making it, nor 
functions as consideration for a return promise. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). 
In the instant case, the sole evidence offered by Mr. Young in support of his 
express contract claim was the firm's indication that it expected to treat him fairly. 
Such a statement commits the speaker to no defined course of conduct and is not a 
promise. Accordingly, there was no evidence offered sufficient to sustain the jury's 
verdict that Mr. Young had an express contractual agreement to share in the fee 
generated from the Krause litigation. Mr. Young's subjective belief that an expression 
of intention to enter into an agreement constituted an enforceable contract is of no 
evidentiary significance. "The self-serving testimony of the parties as to their 
subjective intentions or understandings is not probative evidence of whether the parties 
entered into a contract...." Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Alas. 1982). 
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In the absence of an enforceable agreement, the law is clear that Mr. Young, 
as an employee of the firm, had no claim to any portion of the fee. As the Restatement 
of Agency makes clear, 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit in 
connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf 
of the principal is under a duty to give such profits to the 
principal. 
Restatement2d, Agency § 388. 
Courts have also made clear that an employee working for a fixed salary has 
no claim, either legal or equitable, for additional compensation in the absence of an 
enforceable contractual modification of his employment agreement. For example, in 
Meaney v. Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 735 A.2d 813 (Conn. 1999), the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut held that an employee whose employer had indicated a willingness 
to pay him additional compensation had no enforceable claim for such compensation 
unless an enforceable agreement had been reached. In Meaney, the employee 
recognized that his negotiations hadn't culminated in an enforceable contract 
modification but sought recovery on an equitable basis, arguing that the value of his 
services, coupled with his employer's apparent recognition of such value, gave rise to 
an implied contractual obligation that his employer must pay him the "fair" value of 
such services. The Court rejected the claim, holding that the existence of an express 
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agreement as to the employee's compensation precluded any quasi-contractual right to 
additional compensation. 
The preclusionary rule has been applied in numerous 
cases to deny a claim for judicial relief premised on 
incomplete negotiations on the subject of additional 
compensation for work that falls within the contemplated 
scope of an existing contract. 
735A.2d823. 
As the Court acknowledged in Meaney, any entitlement an employee might 
have for additional compensation beyond his agreed salary, to be legally enforceable, 
must stem not from the employer's apparent recognition that the employee ought to be 
paid more, but only from the employer's express commitment to pay additional 
compensation. 
Even if room may yet exist for the restitutionary 
enforcement of indefinite promises to pay incentive 
compensation in appropriate circumstances, the predicate 
for such claim must be an unconditional commitment to 
pay such compensation . . . . The defendant's agreement 
to the concept of incentive compensation is not the 
functional equivalent of an agreement to pay reasonable 
incentive compensation in a fair amount or a reasonable 
amount. The label of "implied promise," on which 
plaintiff premises his restitutionary claim, cannot 
transform the defendant's agreement to negotiate about 
incentive compensation into an enforceable agreement to 
pay incentive compensation. 
735 A.2d at 824 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in the instant case, the firm's willingness to negotiate with Mr. 
Young on the subject of additional compensation and its representation that it would do 
so fairly, cannot be transformed into a binding promise to pay additional compensation. 
Because no enforceable offer was made to pay Mr. Young a fair and equitable portion 
of the Krause fee, his express contract claim fails as a matter of law and the jury's 
verdict to the contrary must be set aside. 
POINT II. THE PROMISE MR. YOUNG ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE 
WAS TOO INDEFINITE TO BE ENFORCEABLE. 
Even if Mr. Young had been able to present evidence that the firm made an 
express promise to pay him a "fair" amount of the fee generated by the Krause 
litigation, such a promise is too vague and indefinite to permit of judicial enforcement. 
As it is undisputed that the parties never reached agreement on the amount to be paid or 
any formula for arriving at such an amount, the asserted contract lacks any agreement 
on its essential term and is, therefore, unenforceable. 
This Court has repeatedly held that a purported contract which lacks an 
agreement on the amount to be paid or a formula for computing such an amount is not 
an enforceable contract. 
It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the 
integral features of an agreement is essential to the 
formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be 
enforced if its terms are indefinite or demonstrate that 
there was no intent to contract. 
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. . . when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price 
or a method for determining one, "the agreement is too 
indefinite and uncertain for enforcement." 
Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citations 
omitted). See, also, Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1137 (Utah 
1976) (court can't set a reasonable rent when parties' negotiations breakdown); 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988) (same). 
These holdings apply equally in cases where parties have expressly made an 
agreement to agree in the future without fixing the material terms of such a proposed 
agreement. As this Court has recognized, such an agreement to agree is 
"unenforceable because [it] leave[s] open material terms for future considerations and 
the courts cannot create those terms for the parties." Harmony. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 
636, 639 (Utah 1979). 
[W]here there was simply some nebulous notion in the 
air that a contract might be entered into in the future, the 
Court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties 
ought to have made and enforce it. 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1961). 
In the court below, Mr. Young asserted that these principles were 
inapplicable in a case where the promise alleged to have been given involved payment 
for services. Courts, however, have frequently and consistently held that these 
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principles are fully applicable to claimed agreements by which employees seek 
additional compensation in the form of bonuses or other rewards for services over and 
above their agreed salary. 
For example, in Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 111 N.E. 822 
(N.Y.App. 1916), the court was presented with a situation where an employee was 
seeking to enforce his employer's promise of a wage increase and a fair share of the 
profits of the business. 
The question whether the words "fair" and 
"reasonable" have a definite and enforceable meaning 
when used in business transactions is dependent upon the 
intention of the parties in the use of such words and upon 
the subject-matter to which they refer. In cases of 
merchandising and in the purchase and sale of chattels 
the parties may use the words "fair and reasonable 
value" as synonymous with "market value." A promise 
to pay the fair market value of goods may be inferred 
from what is expressly agreed by the parties. The fair, 
reasonable or market value of goods can be shown by 
direct testimony of those competent to give such 
testimony. The competency to speak grows out of 
experience and knowledge. The testimony of such 
witnesses does not rest upon conjecture . . . . 
In the case of a contract for the sale of goods or for 
hire without a fixed price or consideration being named it 
will be presumed that a reasonable price or consideration 
is intended and the person who enters into such a 
contract for goods or services is liable therefor as on an 
implied contract. Such contracts are common, and when 
there is nothing therein to limit or prevent an implication 
-25-
as to the price, they are, so far as the terms of the 
contract are concerned, binding obligations. 
The contract in question, so far as it relates to a 
share of the defendant's profits, is not only uncertain but 
it is necessarily affected by so many other facts that are 
in themselves indefinite and uncertain that the intention 
of the parties is pure conjecture. A fair share of the 
defendant's profits may be any amount from a nominal 
sum to a material part according to the particular views 
of the person whose guess is considered. Such an 
executory contract must rest for performance upon the 
honor and good faith of the parties making it. The courts 
cannot aid parties in such a case when they are unable or 
unwilling to agree upon the terms of their own proposed 
contract. 
I l l N.E. 823-24. 
This statement of law is as applicable today as when it was written. It was 
cited recently by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in Freeman 
v. Pearlman. 706 N. Y.S.2d 405 (App.Div. 2000), when the Court stated that 
as to that portion of the cause of action for breach of the 
alleged oral contract that the motion court dismissed, we 
find that the court properly held that alleged promises 
made early in the parties' relationship to provide "fair 
compensation" and to "equitably" divide the draw were 
too indefinite to be enforced. 
706 N. Y. S. 2d at 407-08 (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has adopted the same reasoning. In 
Turcott v. Gilbane Building Co.. 179 A.2d 491 (R.I. 1962), the Court held that an 
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alleged promise to pay an existing employee "a fair and equitable share of the profits, 
fees and earnings of [the employer] resulting from the [employee's] efforts . . . " was 
"too vague, indefinite, ambiguous, and insufficient" to provide for judicial relief. 179 
A.2dat491, 493. 
Similarly, in Gray v. Aiken, 54 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. 1949), the Court held that 
an agreement to divide profits "equitably" was too indefinite to be enforced. 
If we could adopt the view of counsel for the plaintiff, 
that the terms, "fair share," "reasonable share," or "just 
share," are contemplated by the contract and are specific, 
we would be confronted with the unsurmountable hurdle 
of arriving at a method by which such share could be 
determined . . . . 
The alleged contract does not with sufficient definiteness 
indicate any basis upon which the plaintiff's share of the 
profits could be determined. If plaintiffs proposal and 
defendant's reply be considered separately, or if they be 
consolidated, the result as to certainty in the terms and 
conditions of the contract would be the same. The 
correspondence is vague, indefinite, and uncertain, and 
is insufficient to sustain an action at law or in equity for 
breach of contract. 
54 S.E.2d at 589-90. 
These principles are no different in a case involving a lawyer. In fact, in 
Keeling v. KronicL Tiedman & Girard. No. JFM-OO-133, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209 
(D.Md. 2001) (copy of opinion in addendum), the Court dismissed a claim by an 
associate attorney seeking recovery from his employer law firm for beach of a promise 
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to pay him a fair bonus in connection with a fee earned in one of his cases. In 
dismissing the case for failure to state a claim, the court held that a "promise to pay an 
employee fairly or in keeping with industry standards is not definite enough to form the 
basis of a contract." Id. at p. 5. 
In Keeling, the attorney alleged he was promised that he would receive a fair 
and reasonable bonus on any class action cases wherein he was an originating attorney. 
After he had been working on such a case for a number of years, the plaintiffs case 
settled, resulting in the firm receiving a fee of $15,000,000.00. The firm paid the 
associate a $100,000.00 bonus (less than Mr. Young was offered in this case on a 
recovery over twenty times smaller) and he sued for more. The court, quoting from a 
California appellate court decision, noted that a promise of fair and reasonable 
additional compensation was a promise of no contractual significance. 
To anoint such puffing language with contractual import 
would open the door to a plethora of specious litigation 
and constitute a severe and unwarranted intrusion on the 
ability of business enterprises to manage internal affairs. 
Id. at 5-6. 
Similarly, in Jackson v. Ford, 555 S.E.2d 143 (Ga.App. 2001), the 
court upheld a summary judgment awarded to an employer, rejecting an attorney's 
claim that he was entitled to additional compensation from his employer in the form of 
a bonus. In doing so, the court noted that " to be enforceable, a promise of future 
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compensation must 'be for an exact amount or based upon a formula or method for 
determining the exact amount of the bonus.' The sum must be 'definitely and 
objectively ascertainable from [the] contract."' 555 S.E.2d at 146 (citations omitted). 
The court found that the parties had not reached an agreement which specified the 
amount of the promised bonus and held, therefore, that the "oral promise to pay 
[plaintiff] incentive compensation was too indefinite to be a legally enforceable 
obligation" M. at 147. 
In short, a promise to pay an employee a fair amount of additional 
compensation, without further agreement as to an amount or a formula for computing 
an amount, is a promise which (even if made) is too vague and indefinite to form the 
basis of a contract. 
POINT III. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS RULINGS ON THE PARTIES' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM. 
In the trial court, Mr. Young argued that his conduct in practicing law in 
competition with his employer didn't constitute a breach of fiduciary duty because, as a 
"mere employee" of the firm, he owed the firm no duty of noncompetition. This 
argument, which is inconsistent with all authority on the subject, was accepted by the 
trial court when it granted Mr. Young's motion for summary judgment on this claim. 
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Every court in the country which has issued an opinion on the subject has 
held that an employee breaches his duty of loyalty to his employer if he competes with 
his employer within the scope of his agency. As stated by the Restatement2d, Agency 
§393 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not 
to compete with the principal concerning the subject of 
his agency. 
While few employees have ever sought to deny this universally accepted rule 
of law, in the two reported decisions where the claim was made that "mere employees" 
owe no duty of noncompetition, the argument was rejected out of hand. For example, 
in Fry tech. Inc. v. Harris, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D.Kan. 1999), the Court held that 
even if a defendant is a "mere employee" 
the defendants err in suggesting this relieved him of any 
duty of good faith or loyalty toward the corporation. 
While most of the cases which have addressed fiduciary 
responsibilities of agents under Kansas law have involved 
corporate directors or officers, there is no basis for 
concluding these are the only types of agents subject to 
fiduciary duties. Significantly, defendants cite no 
authority for their suggestion that agents owe no duty to 
their employer. To the contrary, the cases speak of the 
duties of agents without respect to their exact status. In 
Bessmanv. Bessman. 214 Kan. 510, 519, 520 P.2d 1210 
(1974), the court recognized the "universal application of 
the rule" restricting the right of a dishonest agent to 
compensation. The court also acknowledged with 
approval the statement 
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An agent or employee of another is prohibited from 
acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency and 
trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good 
faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties. Not 
only must he account to his principal for secret profits 
but he also forfeits his right to compensation for services 
rendered by him if he proves disloyal. 
The defendants' argument that "mere employees" owe no 
duty of loyalty or good faith to their employer is without 
merit. 
46 F. Supp. 2d at 1152-53. 
Similarly, in Kiebutz & Associates, Inc. v. Rehn. 842 P.2d 985 (Wash.App. 
1992), the Court rejected the contention that employees are free to compete with their 
employer in the absence of an express agreement not to do so. Like Mr. Young, the 
defendants in Rehn "presented no rationale which would support a decision to reject the 
[Restatement] section 393 rule." 842 P.2d at 988. 
The Restatement also expressly rejects the notion that an employee is not 
subject to the normal duties of an agent. "The rules as to the duties and liabilities to the 
principal of agents who are not servants apply to servants." Restatement2d, Agency 
§ 429. 
The suggestion that a mere employee owes no duties of a fiduciary nature to 
his employer simply has no judicial support. As stated by the Court in AGA 
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Aktiebalag v. ABA Optical Corp. Inc., 441 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), in 
discussing the duty owed by a salesman to his employer, the employee 
owed a fiduciary duty to his employer and was prohibited 
while employed from acting in any manner inconsistent 
with the agency or trust relationship. He was at all times 
bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the 
performance of his duties. 
441 F. Supp. at 754. The Court found this duty to have been breached by the 
employee's conduct in competing with his employer. 
In short, 
It is well settled that the employment relationship is one 
of trust and confidence and places upon the employee a 
duty to use his best efforts on behalf of his employer. 
The general rule is that he who undertakes to act for 
another in any matter of trust or confidence shall not in 
the same matter act for himself against the interest of the 
one relying upon his integrity. 
Las Luminaries of New Mexico Council of the Blind v. Isengard, 587 P.2d 444, 445 
(N.M.App. 1978). 
The law is also clear that an employee cannot compete with his employer by 
providing services to customers who were not otherwise dealing with his employer, 
contrary to Mr. Young's position below. 
For example, in Chevron v. Reyes, 570 A.2d 1282 (N.J.Super. 1990), the 
Court found that an employee who was hired by plaintiff as an auditor breached his 
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fiduciary duty by performing personal auditing services for companies which were not 
his employer's customers. The court explicitly rejected the idea that this type of 
activity was not actionable. After noting that the employee had only an oral 
employment agreement with no express restriction against competition, the court 
articulated the oft repeated rules governing the conduct of all employees. 
An employee owes a duty of loyalty to the employer and 
must not, while employed, act contrary to the employer's 
interest. During the period of employment, the 
employee has a duty not to compete with the employer's 
business. 
570 A.2d at 1284 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that this duty extended to 
performing paid auditing services for anyone. 
Plaintiff was entitled to expect that a person on his 
payroll would not undertake to pursue competitive 
commercial opportunities. The protection accorded is 
not limited to the diversion of an employer's customers. 
It extends to pursuing and transacting business within the 
larger pool of potential customers who might have been 
solicited by the employer. 
570 A.2dat 1285. 
Mr. Young's contention that he owed his employer no duty of non-
competition has no support in the law of this, or any other, state. 
Conducting a secret law practice in competition with one's employer is not 
only a breach of fiduciary duty, it is a violation of an attorney's ethical obligations, 
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warranting disciplinary action. See Rogers v. The Mississippi Bar. 731 S.2d 1158 
(Miss. 1999); In re Brunner. 535 N.W.3d 438 (Wis. 1995). In fact, it has been held 
that an associate attorney who personally keeps legal fees earned while employed by a 
law firm is an appropriate subject for disbarment. In In re Murdock, 968 P.2d 1270 
(Or. 1998), the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to consider the appropriate penalty to 
impose on an associate of a law firm who pocketed $9,442.78 in fees earned while 
employed by a law firm. The Court had no difficulty in finding such a breach of 
fiduciary duty to constitute actual dishonesty. 
The accused had a fiduciary duty to act honestly in his 
dealings with the firm and had an obligation to give it all 
profits earned for the firm while an employee of the 
firm. His failure to do so clearly was an act of 
dishonesty. 
The Court articulated the issue presented by such conduct, and its appropriate 
resolution, in plain terms. 
The issue in this lawyer disciplinary case is 
straightforward: Should a lawyer who embezzles money 
from his or her law firm be disbarred? We hold that 
disbarment generally is the appropriate sanction for such 
dishonesty. 
968P.2dat 1271. 
Given Mr. Young's conduct in engaging in the practice of law in competition 
with his employer, the summary judgment entered in his favor must be reversed and the 
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matter remanded for determination of the appropriate remedy for such conduct. On 
remand, the trial court will need guidance from this Court in determining the criteria to 
use in making such a determination, as this was a contested issue prior to the court's 
ruling in Mr. Young's favor. 
The question presented centers on the appropriate remedy for this violation. 
The position of the Restatement is clear: 
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct 
which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of 
loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a wilful and 
deliberate breach of his contract of service, he is not 
entitled to compensation even for properly performed 
services for which no compensation is apportioned. 
Restatement2d, Agency § 469. 
A disloyal employee forfeits the entitlement to any compensation for the 
period of his breach of duty. As stated by the Court in Bon Temps Agency Ltd. v. 
Greenfield, 584 N.Y.S.2d 824 (App.Div. 1992), an employee who competes with his 
employer must not only disgorge secret profits, he forfeits the right to any payment for 
his services. 
It is well settled that [an employee] is prohibited from 
acting in any manner inconsistent with is agency or trust 
and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good 
faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties. Not 
only must the employee or agent account to his principal 
for secret profits but he also forfeits his right to 
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compensation for services rendered by him if he proves 
disloyal. 
584 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26. 
If a disloyal employee is paid during the period of his infidelity, he is subject 
to an action for repayment of such earnings. 
An employee whose actions are disloyal to the interests 
of his employer forfeits his right to compensation for 
services rendered by him and if he is paid without 
knowledge of his disloyalty he may be compelled to 
return what he has improperly received. 
Harry R. Defler Corp. v. Kleemam 243 N.Y.S.2d 930, 938 (App.Div. 1963). 
This Court has previously acknowledged that a faithless agent has no claim 
for the supposed value of services rendered. In Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah2d 62, 387 
P.2d 239 (1963), this Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff for services rendered, 
ruling that the plaintiff's breach of his fiduciary duty to his principal precluded him 
from seeking payment for his services. 
In Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe. 406 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1969), the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held an agent who breaches his fiduciary duty forfeits 
his rights to any compensation during the period of his breach and rejected the 
argument the rule should be otherwise in cases where part of the agent's services 
during the period in question were of value to the employer and properly performed. 
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The fact that the employee may have provided some valuable service during the period 
in question "is no answer to the established violation of duty." 406 F.2d at 1062. 
This same result was reached in Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th 
Cir. 1976), wherein the Court noted that "[t]he forfeiture does not depend upon 
whether the employee earned the salary, but is intended as a deterrent to wrongful 
conduct." 538 F.2d at 175. Because public policy dictates that a faithless employee 
forfeit his claim for salary, the argument that some of his services were of value and 
should be compensated must be rejected. 
For example, in ABC Trans Nat'l Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics 
Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 1229 (Ill.App. 1980), the Court overturned the trial 
court's decision to allow disloyal employees to retain two-thirds of their salary under 
the theory that such was the value that could be "apportioned" to their services 
rendered in a faithful manner. The Court noted that the Restatement's reference to 
apportionment has no application to a salaried employee who is simply paid a specified 
amount for specific period of work, as opposed to commissions or fees relating to 
particular transactions. 
The confusion over "total" versus "partial" salary 
forfeitures, as expressed in the apportionment principles, 
is eliminated by the recognition that within the actual 
period of tortuous conduct, salary forfeiture is required 
because the agents' services are not being "properly" 
performed. The agent retains compensation rightfully 
-37-
earned before the breach, for specific periods. As a 
matter of public policy..., however one who breaches 
fiduciary duties has no entitlement to compensation 
during a wilful or deliberate course of conduct adverse to 
the principal's interest. 
413 N.E.2d at 1315. 
In so holding, the Court quoted from the Illinois Supreme Court decision in 
Vendo v. Stoner, 321 N.E.2d 1 (111. 1974), wherein the Court required a competing 
employee to forfeit three and a half years of salary and indicated that it "borders upon 
the frivolous" for a defendant to claim a right to salary during periods when he was 
breaching his fiduciary duty. 321 N.E.2d at 14. 
As the Restatement makes clear, if an employee's breach of duty is "wilful 
and deliberate," a total forfeiture of compensation is mandated. A "breach of contract 
is wilful and deliberate, as those words are herein used, only when the agent . . . is 
guilty of disloyal . . . conduct." Restatement2d, Agency § 456, comment c. 
Section 456 deals generally with an employee's breach of contract, but it 
makes it clear, when read properly, that an employee guilty of a breach of his duty of 
loyalty has no claim for compensation. Subsection (b) indicates that an employee who 
breaches his employment contract has a claim to be paid for the value of his pre-
termination services "if, but only if, the agent's breach is not wilful and deliberate." 
The comment then defines a breach of the duty of loyalty to be a "wilful and 
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deliberate" breach. It simply can't be denied that, under the Restatements formulation, 
a breach of the duty of loyalty equates with a complete loss of compensation. If there 
were any question about this it is dispelled by the provisions of § 469. 
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct 
which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of 
loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a wilful and 
deliberate breach of his contract of services, he is not 
entitled to compensation even for properly performed 
services for which no compensation is apportioned. 
Restatement2d, Agency § 469. 
Salary forfeiture is required in the case of a disloyal employee who converts 
funds properly belonging to his employer because to do otherwise would be to fail to 
give any meaning to the duty of loyalty. As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Vendo Co. v. Stover, 321 N.E.2d 1 (111. 1974), if an unfaithful servant is merely 
required to disgorge what he took wrongfully, that 
would mean that a fiduciary could violate his duty 
without incurring any risk. For if his misconduct were 
discovered the most that he could lose would be the 
profit he gained from his illegal venture; the law would 
have operated only to restore him to the same position he 
would have been in had he faithfully performed his 
duties. 
321 N.E.2dat 10. 
The grant of summary judgment to Mr. Young should be reversed and the 
matter remanded with instructions to enter a finding of liability against Mr. Young for 
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breach of fiduciary duty and to order forfeiture of all compensation paid to Mr. Young 
during the period of his disloyalty as determined upon retrial. 
POINT IV. EVEN IF MR. YOUNG HAD AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT 
FOR PAYMENT OF A FAIR PORTION OF THE LEGAL FEE IN 
QUESTION, THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE 
EVIDENCE THE FIRM COULD PRESENT ABOUT MR. YOUNG'S 
CONDUCT WHILE AT THE FIRM. 
As the sole issue the jury was asked to consider was what was a fair amount 
of compensation for Mr. Young to receive, the Court's order prohibiting the firm from 
presenting evidence of Mr. Young's conduct in breaching his fiduciary duty to the firm 
unduly restricted the firm from presenting all of the circumstances concerning the 
relationship of the parties. As a judgment about what is "fair" is an inherently 
subjective decision in light of all the circumstances, permitting Mr. Young to 
demonstrate his valuable contributions to the firm without permitting the firm to 
demonstrate that Mr. Young was simultaneously engaging in conduct which was 
detrimental to the firm had the inevitable effect of tainting the jury's view of what was 
"fair." Accordingly, even if this Court were to hold that Mr. Young had an 
enforceable express contractual claim for a fair portion of the Krause fee, a 
determination that his conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty would require a 
new trial on this issue of what would be fair in light of that misconduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Young's own testimony about his negotiations with the firm regarding 
proposed additional compensation demonstrates that he received no promise which 
could form the basis of a contract. Even the agreement he alleged to have been made 
was too vague and indefinite to be enforced. The judgment on the counterclaim should 
be reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the firm. 
As Mr. Young has acknowledged engaging in a law practice in competition 
with the firm while its employee, the summary judgment entered in his favor on the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim should be reversed and the case remanded with 
instructions that judgment should be entered on that claim in favor of the firm in an 
amount equal to the compensation paid to Mr. Young during the period of his 
disloyalty, plus any profit he received from his competition, as determined upon retrial 
by the jury. 
DATED this ^> day of August, 2002. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. D^vid Eckersley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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TO: 
FROM: 
RE: 
ROBERT S. YOUNG 
JOHN S. CHINDLUND 
DIVISION OF RECOVERY - CHUCK KRAUSE and 
MOUNTAIN WEST HELICOPTER 
The following is the Eoard's proposal that John Ashton and I 
previously discussed with you, regarding the division of any recovery 
in the above-referenced cases. 
First, all costs that have been advanced by the firm will be 
reimbursed from any recovery. 
Second, all the.regular hourly fees at the applicable .hourly. 
rates for all of the attorney and paralegal time spent on these cases 
by you and any others from the firm will be paid to the firm. 
Third, any remaining amount will be divided one-third (1/3) 
to you and two-thirds (2/3) to the firm. 
John and I felt thax it would be in everyone's best interest 
to put this understanding in writing. If this arrangement is 
acceptable, please sign below. If you have any questions, please 
contact John or me. 
PRINCE, YEATE$^Sc GELDZAHLER 
ROBERT S. YOUNG 
* E X H I B I T 
MEMO 
To: John Ashton and John Chindlund 
From: Rob Young J^^H-n 
Subject: Division of Feei from Krause v. Lycoming and Mountain West Helicopters v. 
Lycoming, et al. and my future relationship with the firm. 
Date: June 15, 1999 
As you know, a short while ago John Chindlund provided me a one-page memorandum, a 
copy of which I have attached hereto, outlining a proposed agreement under the terms of which 
we would divide the fees from the two cases identified above one-third to me and two-thirds to 
the firm (after reducing the total fees collected by the amount of the fees I have billed in the two 
cases). Since I believe our discussions are more involved than reflected in the memorandum, I 
have, at the request of John Chindlund, attempted to reduce to writing my understanding of the 
nature of our discussions. This memorandum contains that effort and, though I apologize for its 
length, I have tried to cover everything I thought to be part of our discussions including a few 
additional things that I wish to have clarified as part of the discussion. 
1. Calculation and Distribution of the Fee. 
a. Initially you proposed I "make up" the difference between what I have collected 
and the average collections of firm partners (as I recall, in the neighborhood of 
$220,000 to $240,000 per year) and that we deduct that difference from the total 
fee before dividing the balance one-third to me and two-thirds to the firm. 
b. I counter offered (so to speak) that I "make-up" the difference between what I 
have collected and the average collections of those in my annual pay range, i.e., 
the lower collecting partners and higher collecting associates (as I recall, in the 
neighborhood of $130,000 to $150,000 per year) and that we deduct that 
difference from the total fee before the 1/3-2/3 division of the balance. 
c. Ultimately, you proposed that we deduct, from the total fee collected, the amount 
of the fees I have billed and, thereafter divide the remainder 1/3-2/3. I will agree 
to your most recent proposal, with the following two adjustments as well as the 
firm's agreement on the other items identified herein which we have also 
discussed or which I would now like some clarification on. The two adjustments 
on the calculation are: 
i. A 20% reduction of the total fees billed. Since, in the proposals identified 
in 1(a) and 1(b) above, you have acknowledged the firm collects amounts 
billed at the rate of approximately 80%, I think it is only fair that we 
reduce the total fees billed by 20%. 
ii. A second reduction determined by the fee first collected (since the two 
cases are unlikely to be resolved at the same time). As I have indicated, I 
expect the recovery in the pilot case (and the corresponding fee), to be 
approximately three to four times higher than the recovery in the hull case. 
Accordingly, I suggest, if the fee in the pilot case is first collected, the 
amount calculated under 1(c)(1) above be reduced by another 20% (or one 
fifth). If the fee in the hull case is first recovered, then the amount 
calculated under l(c)(i) above should be reduced by another 80% (or four 
fifths). It is currently, of course, more probable that the fee in the pilot 
case will be first collected, since it is set for trial in October while the hull 
case is set for trial in August 2000. 
(1) The remaining amount not deducted would be carried forward for 
deduction when the fee in the second case is collected, 
iii. By way of example, using a $400,000 collected fee in the pilot case, a 
$100,000 collected fee in the hull case and $300,000 in fees billed, the 
respective calculations in the pilot and hull cases are: 
(1) Pilot Case - $400,000 - (($300,000 x .80) x .80) = $208,000. 
Accordingly, I would get $69,333.33 and the firm would get the 
remaining $330,666.67. 
(2) Hull Case - $ 100,000 - (($300,000 x .80) x .20) = $52,000. 
Accordingly, I would get $17,333.33 and the firm would get the 
remaining $82,666.67. 
d. There will be no reduction (for purposes of fee calculation) for expenses incurred, 
since the contracts with both Chuck Krause and Mountain West Helicopters, 
contemplate reimbursement of expenses from the clients' share of the recovery. 
2. Future Relationship with the Firm. 
a. I have agreed, in principal, to the 1/3-2/3 distribution because, among other 
things, our discussions have included: (1) John Ashton's indication that I would be 
made a partner upon collecting these fees; and (2) John Chindlund's indication 
that we don't want to "poison the well" going forward and, presumably (this, of 
course, is my interpretation of the discussion), if I agree now to take a lesser 
amount, the firm will feel more committed and/or obligated to me going forward. 
Since I have agreed, in principal, to the 1/3-2/3 distribution based on these two 
"indications," among other things, I was disappointed the memorandum said 
nothing about this. Accordingly, this Memorandum reflects my expectation on 
these two issues, 
i. Partnership status - As you may know, my four-year anniversary at the 
firm fell on April 17, 1999. When I first interviewed here, our discussions 
suggested I would become a partner after two or perhaps, at most, three 
years. Without getting into a discussion as to the reasons therefor (some 
of which, I acknowledge, have to do with my performance to date) that, 
obviously, has not been the case. Accordingly, it is my expectation to 
become a partner, with full right to year-end partnership distributions, 
effective from the time of collecting the fee in the pilot case, 
ii. The firm's commitment to me going forward - The idea behind my 
agreement, in principal, to give a larger share to the firm than to me (when 
I brought the work to the firm and have done every minute of the same), is 
to obtain the firm's goodwill and commitment to me going forward. When 
these cases are resolved, as we have discussed, it is possible, if not 
probable, that my work load will drop off on a temporary basis. 
Accordingly, it is my expectation that the firm will commit to me, at least, 
through fiscal year 2001, which ends a little more than one year after the 
hull case is set for trial. 
(1) Knowing very little (if hot essentially nothing) about the firm's 
financial condition, I would like some representation from 
members of the board that the firm's financial condition permits it 
to undertake such a future commitment. If not, I would like to 
discuss some other guaranty as to that commitment going forward. 
3. Miscellaneous Issues 
a. Compensation - My current compensation, frankly, at my stage in life, has been 
difficult to live on. While I recognize (and agree) that compensation should be 
more a function of performance than stage in life, I think my performance, after 
collecting the fees in these cases, cannot be questioned. Accordingly, after 
collecting the fee in the pilot case, I would expect, at minimum, an increase of 
$15,000 annually in my rate of pay with that rate not to be reduced through the 
end of fiscal year 2001. 
b. Sharing the Wealth - With what I expect to be a fairly large bonus pool to draw 
from, after collecting the fee in the pilot case, I would like to have a say, on the 
compensation committee, as to how that pool gets divided up. I do not expect to 
have a say in my own bonus, but I do want a say in others. 
c. My distribution - Frankly, I do not know if my share of the fee will come to me in 
the form of a lump sum check with no deductions, or as a payroll/bonus-type 
check with deductions for FICA, federal and state income tax, etc. I would like an 
answer to that and, if I have a choice, would prefer a lump sum distribution. 
However it comes, I intend to make a 401(k) contribution, at the same rate I am 
now contributing, with a matching contribution from the firm at the same rate the 
firm is currently matching. 
d. Timing -1 am getting some heat from the Texas firm to reimburse it for our share 
of expenses. While I recognize and acknowledge my contribution to the delay in 
finalizing our understanding on this, I now feel like we must have this resolved, 
and the Texas firm reimbursed by July 1, 1999. I am willing to sit down, at 
length, to finalize all of the terms and conditions hereof, however, if we cannot 
have them reimbursed by July 1, 1999,1 will feel some obligation to take care of 
that myself. I would be happy to visit with you any day this week, in an effort to 
wrap this up, but can only commit to a lunch visit on Friday. Please let me know 
when we might finalize this. 
I too would like to reduce our final agreement to written form to be signed by the firm 
and by me. However, I think it makes some sense to discuss this before doing so. I look forward 
to finalizing this. 
M E M O 
To: John Ashton, Carl Barton, Richard Blanck, John Chindlund, Jay Gamble and Roger 
McConkie 
From: Rob Young-
Subject: Follow up to rhy-Memos of June 15 and 23, 1999 and the Board meeting of June 23, 
1999 regarding the Division of Fees from Krause v. Lycoming and Mountain West 
Helicopters v. Lycoming, et al. and my future relationship with the firm. 
Date: July 2, 1999 
This memo follows my memos of June 15 and 23 and the Board meeting of June 23, 
1999. First and foremost, I wish to inform each of you that we have agreed, in principle, to the 
essential terms of settlement in the pilot case (Krause v. Lycoming et al.). While we have not yet 
seen nor, obviously, executed settlement documents, the essence of the agreement is that Chuck 
Krause will receive 3.25 million dollars in full settlement of all claims. More importantly (at 
least as far as the Mountain West case is concerned) 3.2 million dollars, or 98.5% of the total 
settlement amount, will be paid by AlliedSignal/Lycoming which improves the prospects of 
successfully resolving the Mountain West case. We expect to see and execute settlement 
Ibcuments sometime"this month. We ftifther expect to receive funds as soon as August and 
certainly no later than the end of this fiscal year. I hope this comes as good news to you. I am 
very happy with the result. As previously discussed, this will result in a fee of $650,000. 
As you know, during the June 23 Board meeting, the Board made clear to me it was 
unwilling to commit to my partnership status (noting that such a commitment required an 80% 
approval vote by shareholders), even though I requested that contingent upon successfully 
resolving these cases. Moreover, the Board was also unwilling to commit to me for the future (I 
requested a commitment through fiscal year 2001), again, even though I had requested that 
contingent upon successful resolution. I respectfully suggest, with the successful resolution of 
the pilot case, the Board and/or the shareholders should now have no hesitation to give me a yes 
or no answer to each of the items requested in my June 15 memo and I request, with this memo, 
an answer or the Board's proposal with respect to each of the issues raised therein. I will also 
suggest that, since we now know the essence of the terms of settlement, the proposals for 
dividing the fee should be in dollar amounts or form rather than formula form. 
You will also recall that in my June 15 memo, I requested that we have this resolved "and 
the Texas firm reimbursed by July 1, 1999." There was some discussion in the Board meeting 
about the firm having paid $20,000 and reached an agreement with the Texas firm to pay the 
balance at the rate of $5,000 per week. I knew nothing of that arrangement, but assumed it to be 
accurate. However, on June 28, 1999,1 received the attached facsimile/letter from Jon Kettles. 
The letter speaks for itself and, needless to say, I was quite embarrassed by its tone since this is a 
firm I have enjoyed working with very much, will continue to work with in the Mountain West 
case, and hope to work with again in the future. Accordingly, I have personally reimbursed the 
Texas firm at no small effort on my part. I do not intend to jeopardize my interest in this fee. ( ? E X H I B I T I ! _i> I 
Finally, I will again reiterate that I think it is time to get these issues resolved. I received. 
a couple of days ago, copies of the firm's 1999 budget, sample employment contracts, etc. from 
Carl Barton. I have reviewed those documents and am gaining a better understanding of how the 
firm operates. Personally, I find myself at a crossroads stage of my life wondering if this is the 
place for me. While I will not say the events of the past few weeks have poisoned my well, I will 
say that my well is somewhat contaminated by these events. I have, all in all, enjoyed being here 
and would like to stay. However, that, of course, is largely contingent upon feeling that I am 
contributing something worthwhile and being fairly treated and rewarded for that contribution. 
At present, I prefer to resolve these issues and stay at the firm. However, I am also quite 
comfortable with the prospect of leaving the firm and asking a judge or arbitrator to equitably 
distribute the fee. Accordingly, I will now suggest, and give notice, that I will leave the firm, 
effective July 16, 1999, if we are unable to agree on an equitable distribution of the fee, and my 
status and future here. If, for any reason, you think that timetable is unreasonable, please let me 
know. I am happy to reconsider and look forward to meeting with the Board in an effort to 
resolve these issues. 
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OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM 
Pro se plaintiff Thomas Keeling has brought this action against Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann, & 
Girard ("KMTG") and William Kershaw. Keeling asserts contract and tort claims under California law. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion will be granted in part. 
I. 
According to Keeling's Complaint, the relevant facts are as follows: In 1994 Keeling began working 
for KMTG, a law firm, as an [*2] associate. In persuading Keeling to work for KMTG, Kershaw, a lawyer 
and shareholder at KMTG, told Keeling that he would have the opportunity to work on class action 
litigation. Kershaw also promised Keeling that, for originating and prosecuting class actions, Keeling's 
compensation would be fair and consistent with other attorneys in class action practice generally. See 
Complaint P 9. 
Keeling alleges that, while at KMTG, he was one of the originating attorneys for the Honda litigation. 
Kershaw allegedly told Keeling that he would be "treated fairly as the originating attorney in accord with 
the ordinary and customary standards of the profession." Complaint P 19. Keeling worked substantially on 
the Honda litigation over a period of years. The Honda litigation settled in December 1998, and Kronick 
received approximately 15 million dollars in attorney's fees. See Complaint P 33. Keeling eventually 
received a $ 100,000 dollar bonus from Kronick for his work on the Honda litigation. Keeling alleges that 
he is entitled to a bonus of 15% of the attorney's fees based on his work in the Honda litigation. 
Keeling also alleges that in early 1998 Kershaw secretly helped another law [*3] firm on the 
Plaintiffs's Executive Committee in the Honda litigation (Rapazzini & Graham) to settle individual 
plaintiffs claims against Honda. These settlements, according to Keeling, were unethical because they were 
made outside of the settlement procedures established in the Honda litigation. They were made without 
knowledge of the Court, the Plaintiffs's Executive Committee, and without payment of the court ordered 
Management Fee. 
On April 14, 1998, Keeling asked a Kronick senior shareholder whether Kershaw's actions were 
ethical. On April 17, 1998, Keeling told Kershaw that he should obtain an ethics opinion from an 
independent source. On May 19, 1998 Kershaw, allegedly in retaliation for Keeling's inquiries, removed 
Keeling from the Honda litigation and transferred him to another department. On March 1, 1999, Kronick 
terminated Keeling's employment. 
II. 
In his complaint, Keeling states that a contract was formed when Kershaw told him he would be 
"compensated fairly out of the profits generated by the [Honda litigation]... in accord with the ordinary 
and customary standards of the profession." Complaint P 17. The defendants argue that these alleged 
statements are too [*4] uncertain to be enforceable. 
Under California law, vague contracts are void. See Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Vean Stone, 35 Cal. 
App. 3d 396,407, 110 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). Of course, not every term in a contract must be 
precise. See id.; Cal. Civ. Code § 1610 (consideration need not be specific); Hennefer v. Butcher, 182 Cal. 
App. 3d 492, 500, 227 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (modern trend disfavors voiding contracts for 
uncertainty). California courts have had several opportunities to determine when a contract is too vague in 
the employment compensation context. Keeling relies on a series of older California cases. Sabatini v. 
Hensley is typical of the line of cases. 161 Cal. App. 2d 172, 174, 326 P.2d 622 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
In Sabatini, the employer promised the employee a bonus based on the success of the business. 
Specifically, the employer told the employee, "I starve, you starve; I prosper, you prosper." Id. The Court 
held that the terms of the bonus were not too vague and that a contract was formed. See, e.g., id; Carney v. 
Hayter, 62 Cal. App. 2d 792, 797-98, 145 P.2d 712 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); [*5] Hunter v. Ryan, 109 
Cal. App. 736, 738, 293 P. 825 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930). 
In contrast to the Sabatini line of cases, the defendants rely on two recent California cases. In Ladas v. 
California State Auto Association, three insurance sales representatives were allegedly promised by their 
employer that their salaries would be increased to "maintain a compensation parity in keeping with industry 
standards." 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 767-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, in Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., an 
employer allegedly promised an employee salary increases or bonuses which were "appropriate" to his 
performance and responsibilities. 19 Cal. App. 4th 201, 213-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (overruled on other 
grounds). Both Ladas and Rochlis held that the promise was too vague to be the basis of an enforceable 
contract. 
I believe that a California court would follow Ladas and Rochlis and not the Sabatini line of cases. A 
promise to pay an employee fairly or in keeping with industry standards is not definite enough to form the 
basis of a contract. As Ladas stated, "To anoint such puffing language with contractual [*6] import would 
open the door to a plethora of specious litigation and constitute a severe and unwarranted intrusion on the 
ability of business enterprises to manage internal affairs." 19 Cal. App. 4th at 772. Under Ladas and 
Rochlis, the promise to pay Keeling fairly and in accord with industry standard is too vague to form the 
basis of an enforceable contract. Kershaw's puffing language was too vague to alert a reasonable person 
that a contract had been formed or what the exact terms of the contract were, nl 
nl Keeling argues that Kershaw intentionally interfered with the contract between Keeling and 
Kronick to provide Keeling with a bonus based on his work in the Honda litigation. This claim fails 
because a contract did not exist between Keeling and Kronick to provide Keeling with a bonus. See 
PG&E v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 n.2, 270 Cal. Rptr. 1, 791 P.2d 587 (1990) 
(existence of a valid contract is a required element of a claim for intentional interference with a 
contract). Because a contract does not exist, I need not determine whether the manager's privilege 
applies. 
[*7] 
III. 
Keeling also argues promissoi y estoppel based on the same alleged promises by Kershaw. To show 
promissory estoppel under California law, Keeling must show: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) 
reasonable and foreseeable (3) reliance by Keeling; and (4) Keeling must have been injured by his reliance. 
See, e.g., Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. and Loan Association, 60 Cal. App. 3d 885, 890, 131 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. 
Ct, App. 1976). Keeling's promissory estoppel claim fails for the same reason as his breach of contract 
claim. Kershaw's alleged promise to compensate Keeling fairly in accord with industry practice is not clear 
and unambiguous. See Laks, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 889-93; Aguilar v. Int'l Longshoremen's Union Local # 10, 
966 F.2d 443,446 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Laks); see also Ladas, 19 Cal. App. 4th at 772. 
IV. 
Keeling argues that Kershaw's alleged promises to him provide the basis for a fraud claim. To prove 
fraud, Keeling must show: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or 
induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by Keeling; and (4) resulting damages. See Croeni v. Goldstein, 21 
Cal. App. 4th 754, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). [*8] Keeling is unable to show that he justifiably relied on 
Kershaw's alleged promises. As discussed above, Kershaw's promises were too vague to be the basis for a 
contract. "Promises too vague to be enforced will not support a fraud claim any more than they will one in 
contract." Rochlis, 19 Cal. App. 4th at 216. Because Kershaw's promises were vague, Keeling was not 
justified in relying on them. Keeling brings a similar claim for negligent misrepresentation. As with 
intentional fraud, justified reliance is a requirement of negligent misrepresentation. See Alliance Mortgage 
Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1239 n.4, 900 P.2d 601 (1995). Keeling's negligent misrepresentation 
claim fails for the same reason as his fraud claim. 
V. 
Keeling brings a claim for wrongful discharge in connection with his termination from KMTG on 
March 1, 1999. Under California law, to state a claim for wrongful discharge Keeling must show that his 
dismissal violated a public policy that is fundamental, beneficial for the public, and embodied in California 
law. See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 75, 960 P.2d 1046 (1998). 
The defendants argue [*9] that Keeling has failed to state a claim because he has not alleged a public 
policy embodied in California law. Keeling alleges that Kershaw unethically settled certain cases in the 
Honda litigation without following the court ordered settlement procedures. Certain California professional 
ethical laws state a public policy that can be the basis for a wrongful discharge claim. See General 
Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 1181, 876 P.2d 487 (1994); Green, 19 Cal. 4th at 78-79. A 
public policy can form the basis of a wrongful discharge claim in one of four ways: when an employer 
retaliates against an employee for: (1) refusing to violate a law; (2) performing a legal obligation; (3) 
exercising a legal right or privilege; or (4) reporting an alleged violation of a law of public importance. See 
Green, 19 Cal. 4th at 76. 
Keeling first argues, under the second category, that KMTG terminated him for performing a statutory 
obligation. Specifically, Keeling argues that, as a lawyer, he was required to report Kershaw's violations of 
California's ethical laws governing lawyers. However, that is not the case under California law. "The 
California [* 10] Rules of Professional Conduct... do not contain a duty to report ethical violations 
comparable to the duties found in Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-103(A) and Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3." Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (CD. Cal. 1999). n2 Because 
California ethics laws do not require a lawyer to report another lawyer's ethical violations, Keeling cannot 
state a claim for wrongful discharge under the second category. See Green, 19 Cal. 4th at 76. 
n2 In addition to California laws, Keeling argues that the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility state public policies that can be the 
basis for his wrongful discharge claim. However, neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code have 
been adopted in California. See General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1190 n.6. Because they are not 
California law, they cannot be looked to for statements of California public policy that could 
provide a basis for a wrongful discharge claim. See id. 
[*n] 
Next, Keeling argues, under the fourth category, that KMTG terminated him for reporting Kershaw's 
possible ethical violations. Intrinsic to the employment relationship between a law firm and a lawyer is the 
tacit understanding that the firm and the lawyer will practice law ethically. See General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 
4th at 1187 (citing with approval, Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109-10, 593 N.Y.S.2d 
752 (N.Y. 1992)). A lawyer/employee cannot be terminated for reporting a possible violation of a 
California professional law that embodies a fundamental policy. See General Dynamics, 7 Cal 4th at 1181, 
87. o.3 
n3 Because Keeling's conduct was not required by law, he must show that his reporting of the 
alleged ethical violations did not violate any client confidences. See General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th 
at 1188-89. That is not an issue in this case. 
As the defendants note, the policy must be intended for the benefit of the public and not [* 12] merely 
for the benefit of the lawyer or client. See General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1191; Foley v. Interactive Data 
Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 669, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (1988). Keeling points to a variety of laws 
that arguably state a fundamental policy. For example, he argues that section 6068 of California's Business 
and Professional Code states a fundamental public policy. In relevant part, section 6068 states, "It is the 
duty of an attorney to ... never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false 
statement of fact or law." Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 6068(d). By requiring lawyers, as officers of the court, to be 
honest in dealing with the judiciary, section 6068 is designed to facilitate a court's search for justice. See 
Datig v. Dove Books, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 964, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719, 730-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see 
also General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1189-90 n.6. As one court noted, "Our justice system will crumble 
should those, in whose hands are entrusted its preservation and sanctity, betray its fundamental values and 
principles." Morrow v. California, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1261 (Cal. Ct. App' 1995) [*13] (citing section 
6068 and referring to courts as "temples of justice.") Another court stated that enforcement of ethics rules 
like section 6068 "are one way to remind some members of the profession that as officers of the courts they 
have an obligation to the public and to the courts as well as to their clients." Wells Properties v. Popkin, 9 
Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1060 (Cal Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Chief Justice Burger). Section 6068, by facilitating 
a court's search for justice, states a fundamental policy that works for the benefit of the public. 
Keeling has identified other ethics rules that he believes provide a sufficient public policy. For 
example, in his complaint he states that Kershaw violated "California Rules of Professional Conduct 2-200, 
3-310, and other professional and ethical rules." Complaint P 83(C). Because section 6068 states a 
fundamental public policy that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, whether these other ethics rules 
state a fundamental public policy need not be addressed. 
Defendants argue that a sufficient nexus does not exist between Keeling's report of Kershaw's 
violations and Keeling's termination. See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1258, 876 P.2d 1022 
(1994) [*14] (overruled on other grounds). In Turner, a 4 to 5 year gap between the whistleblowing 
activity and the retaliation, without any suggestion that the employee was treated adversely during the 
intervening years, could not constitute a sufficient nexus. Id. Keeling reported Kershaw's violations in 
April of 1998. According to Keeling, within a month he was removed from the Honda litigation and 
transferred to another department. Keeling was terminated in May of 1999. Although a significant time gap 
exists, the time gap is not, as a matter of law, long enough to remove any possibility of a nexus between the 
report and the retaliation. 
The defendants also argues that Keeling's report of Kershaw's ethical violations to a KMTG 
shareholder was insufficient. However, defendants have not cited any California case that requires a lawyer 
to file a formal ethics complaint in order to satisfy the reporting requirement. In Green, the court denied 
defendant's summary judgment motion even though plaintiff only complained to internal management. 19 
Cal. 4th at 77. "By providing the employee with a remedy in tort damages for resisting socially damaging 
organizational conduct, [*15] the courts mitigate the otherwise considerable economic and cultural 
pressures on the individual employee to silently conform." General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1186. 
According to the complaint, Keeling did not silently conform. He brought the possible ethical violations to 
the attention of a KMTG shareholder and suggested that Kershaw obtain an ethics opinion. According to 
the complaint, Keeling was terminated for his actions. Keeling's actions, had they not been thwarted, would 
have vindicated fundamental public policy. That constitutes a sufficient reporting. 
Under Local Rule 703 and 704, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Maryland Court of Appeals 
governed the Honda litigation. See United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 420 (D. Md. 1994). The 
only possible ethical code that Kershaw could have violated in relation to the Honda litigation is 
Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct. General Dynamics held that the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility do not state fundamental 
California policies because they have not been adopted as law in California. 7 Cal. 4th at 1190 n.6. [* 16] 
However, Keeling is not looking to Maryland ethical laws for a California policy. As stated above, section 
6068 states a fundamental California policy that can be the basis for a wrongful discharge action. 
Moreover, the policy stated in section 6068 may well have been implicated by Kershaw's possible 
violations of Maryland ethical laws because section 6068 is substantially similar to Maryland's Rule 3.3. 
See Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 ("Duty of candor to the tribunal.") Because section 6068 
states a fiindamental public policy that can be the basis for a wrongful discharge, Keeling's wrongful 
discharge claim will not be dismissed. 
A separate order effecting the rulings made in this opinion is being entered herewith. 
Date: January 9, 2001 
/s/ 
J. Frederick Motz 
United States District Judge 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is, this 9th day of January 2001 
ORDERED: 
1. That the defendants's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; 
2. That Keeling's claims in Count I, II, III, IV, and V are dismissed; and 
3. That Keeling's claim in Count VII is not dismissed. 
/s/ 
J. Frederick Motz 
United [* 17] States District Judge 
